






















author(s). Takeover Threat, Managerial Incentives, and




It has been argued that takeovers distort managerial incentives in
terms of shortening the investment horizon. This paper attempts to
show that a threat of takeover does not necessarily lead to managerial
myopia. We assume that in a well functioning stock markets, current
prices re￿ect the relevant information to uninformed traders about
the future pro￿tability of the ￿rm. Hence, the probability of takeover
will be a function of future earnings as well. A manager may have
an incentive to shift his resources to the long term projects simply
because the equilibrium price is determined by future earnings and
he can a￿ect the probability of takeover by increasing the equilibrium
price through the long run investments.
1 Introduction
Increasing takeover activities in US corporations in 1980s draw the attention
of researchers in corporate ￿nance to the costs and bene￿ts of takeovers.
Those who support liberal takeover policy argued that takeovers provide a
control mechanism for incumbent management of a di￿usely held companies.
Managers who would otherwise pursue their own interest will be disciplined
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1to act in the interest of the shareholders when they face an increasing threat
of takeover. Hence from a social welfare point of view takeovers are bene￿cial
because they help to reduce the moral hazard problem between the managers
and shareholders. (Manne [5], Grossman and Hart [1], Grossman and Hart
[2], and Scharfstein [6]).
On the other hand the opponents claimed that there is a large distribu-
tional e￿ects of takeovers. In most cases, the appropriate rents enjoyed by
stakeholders of the company, such as managers, workers, suppliers or local
communities, are shifted to the raider and shareholders in the event of a
takeover (Shilefer and Summers [8]).
Another frequent critique to takeovers is that they cause a distortion on
managerial incentives in terms of shortening the investment horizon. This is
because the long term projects are undervalued by stock market, hence ￿rms
which are undertaking such projects su￿ers low stock prices and be attacked
by a raider. In order to prevent takeover attempts, managers will invest in
short term projects in order to keep the stock prices in the market su￿ciently
high (Stein [10], and Schnitzer [7]).
This paper focuses on the last critique to takeovers and attempts to show
that it is not always obvious that the manager gives up long term projects
in anticipation of a takeover. In contrast, he might even invest more on the
long term project in order to decrease the probability of takeover.
2 The Model
Consider a ￿rm owned by a large number of shareholders. The model has
three periods, t = 0;1;2: In period 0 the ￿rm is established and shareholders
hire a manager. The manager is hired from a competitive labor market and
accepts any contract which provides him at least his outside utility, which
can be normalized to zero. After the ￿rm is established, th ￿rm operates
for two periods (period 1 and period 2) at the end of which, the ￿rm is
liquidated and all earnings net of the salary of the manager is distributed
to the shareholders. Immediately after the manager is hired, he decides on
the allocation of his constant amount of time, K, on two types of actions, e1
and e2. e1 stands for e￿ort/time allocated for short term projects/investment
and e2.denotes the e￿ort/time allocated to long term projects.1 The manager
1K could also be interpreted as total cash available for invetment purposes assuming
that there is no borrowing from outside.
2allocates his ￿xed amount of time into either enhancing short-term earnings
or improving the long term value of the ￿rm.
The net returns from actions (gross of payments to the manage) e1 and e2
are denoted by q1 (e1) and q2 (e2),respectively. The returns from short term
investment, q1 (e1), accrues at the end of period 1 and the returns from long
term investment, q2 (e2), accrues at the end of period 2. It is assumed that
qi (0) = 0;q0
i (ei) > 0;q
00
i (ei) < 0 qi (ei) > 0 for all ei > 0 and i = 1;2. It is
also assumed that marginal return to long term investments are greater than
marginal returns from short term investments, q0
2 (e) > q0
1 (e). There is no
discounting between the two periods. For simplicity we will restrict the form
of available contracts to the linear compensation schemes. The manager’s
contract is non-negotiable and consists of a ￿at salary, W, and a bonus from
short term (￿rst period) and long term (second period) earnings.2 Let a
be the percentage of ￿rst period returns he receives, b be the percentage of
second period returns, with 0 ￿ a;b ￿ 1. It is assumed that the manager
is paid W + aq1 (e1) at the end of period 13 and the residual bq2 (e2) of his
compensation at the end of period 2. The manager is assumed to be risk
neutral. He chooses e1 and e2 to maximize his lifetime income subject to his
time constraint. The manager’s problem is
maxe1;e2 I = W + aq1 (e1) + bq2 (e2)
s:t: e1 + e2 ￿ K: (P1)
Let e￿
1;e￿











The second-order condition is satis￿ed by the concavity assumption on the
return functions.
Proposition 1: If a = b then e￿
2 > e￿
1.




1) which in turn implies e￿
2 > e￿
1 by the
assumption that long term projects bring higher returns on the margin
(q0
2 (e) > q0
1 (e) for all e > 0). Therefore if long run projects are more prof-
itable than short run projects on the margin and manager’s shares from
2A linear compensation contract can be justi￿ed on the grounds that the agent is risk
neutral and is exposed to limited liability constraint, hence making him residual claimant
is not possible.
3After the manager is paid in the ￿rst period, the ￿rm distributes the residual as a
dividend.
3earnings are the same in each period he would choose to invest more on the
long term projects than short term projects.
2.1 Threat of Takeover with Exogenous Probability
In the base model there is complete certainty about future. Now we introduce
a threat of a takeover of the ￿rm by a raider. Suppose that the manager
anticipates a takeover with probability ￿ > 0; which could take place right
after the returns to short term investment, q1 (e1), is collected. and he is
paid W + aq1 (e1). The probability of takeover is given exogenously. At the
beginning of period 2 a raider arrives and decides to takeover the ￿rm or not.
If the takeover succeeds the incumbent manager is ￿red, if not he continues
to work under the conditions of the initial contract. The manager’s lifetime
income is
E (I) = W + aq1 (e1) + (1 ￿ ￿)bq2 (e2):
The manager solves the following problem
maxe1;e2 W + aq1 (e1) + (1 ￿ ￿)bq2 (e2)
s:t: e1 + e2 ￿ K: (P2)




1 (K ￿ b e2) + (1 ￿ ￿)bq
0
2 (b e2) = 0:
Proposition 2: If a = b the b e1 > e￿
1.and b e2 < e￿
2.
Note that if ￿ = 0;b ei = e￿












(by the concavity of the return functions the denominator is nonzero at the
equilibrium.) Therefore if a = b the b e1 > e￿
1.and b e2 < e￿
2. If there is a
possibility of a takeover in the beginning of period 2, the manager’s deci-
sion on how to allocate his ￿xed amount of time/e￿ort/cash into projects
with di￿erent horizon is biased towards short term projects whenever a = b.
In other words, the manager can give up some part of relatively pro￿table
investment opportunities in the presence of a threat of a takeover.
42.2 Threat of Takeover with Endogenous Probability
The possible takeover will depend on how the ￿rm is managed. In this
respect the assumption of exogenous probability of takeover is not realistic.
Similar to Grossman and Hart [1] we assume that the probability of takeover
is endogenous. After the ￿rst period returns are realized, a raider comes and
observes q1 (e1) and he ￿gures out q2 (e2). The best the raider can do if he
takes over the ￿rm is v = q2 (e￿
2) + ￿ where ￿ is the raider’s improvement
value. Let ￿ > 0 and be deterministic. The shareholders will sell their
shares if the raider o￿ers a tender price p such that p ￿ v ￿ ￿; where ￿
is the dilution factor which is determined in corporate charter by initial
shareholders. Any tender price p such that p < q2 (e2) is eliminated because
such a price will not be accepted by any shareholder. Hence the tender price
is p = maxfv ￿ ￿;q2 (e2)g.
Takeover has a random cost e c. with a probability density function f (c)
and c is always nonnegative. The raiders’s pro￿t is
v ￿ p ￿ e c = v ￿ maxfv ￿ ￿;q2 (e2)g ￿ e c = minf￿;v ￿ q2 (e2)g ￿ e c:
The raider will takeover the ￿rm as long as his expected pro￿ts are positive.
Therefore the probability of takeover is
￿(￿;q2 (e2)) = prob(minf￿;v ￿ q2 (e2)g ￿ e c > 0):
Given the possibility of takeover, the manager solves the following problem
maxe1;e2 W + aq1 (e1) + [1 ￿ ￿(￿;q2 (e2))]bq2 (e2)
s:t: e1 + e2 ￿ K: (P3)
Let e1;e2 be the solutions to problem P3. We will solve the problem in two
cases.
2.2.1 Case 1 minf￿;v ￿ q2 (e2)g = ￿
In this case the probability of takeover is
￿(￿;q2 (e2)) = prob(c < ￿)
which is independent of the manager’s actions. Therefore we have the fol-
lowing result. When minf￿;v ￿ q2 (e2)g = ￿, e1 = b e1 > e￿
1 and e2 = b e2 < e￿
2.
If the dilution factor is set very high, then the manager cannot a￿ect the
probability of takeover through his actions. So the manager invests more on
the short term projects and less on the long term projects.
52.2.2 Case 2 minf￿;v ￿ q2 (e2)g = v ￿ q2 (e2)
In this case the probability of takeover is
￿(e2;￿;v) = prob(v ￿ q2 (e2) ￿ c > 0) = prob(c < v ￿ q2 (e2))
Notice that ￿v > 0;￿e2 < 0;￿e1 > 0.
The manager’s problem is
maxe1;e2 W + aq1 (e1) + [1 ￿ ￿(e2;￿;v)]bq2 (e2)
s:t: e1 + e2 ￿ K (P4)
The ￿rst-order condition of the problem P4 is
￿aq
0
1 (K ￿ e2) + bq
0
2 (e2)[1 ￿ ￿(e2;￿;v)] ￿ bq2 (e2)￿
0
(e2;￿;v) = 0:
We want to compare e2 to e￿
2. We know from problem P1 that
￿aq
0












































e2 denote the e￿ort elasticity of the prob-
ability of takeover. Note that ￿1 < "￿ < 0 since ￿
0 (e2;￿;v) < 0. Let
"q = [q0
2 (e2)=q2 (e2)]e2 denote the e￿ort elasticity of long term returns with




















Therefore whether e2 is greater or smaller that e￿
2 depends on the relative
e￿ort elasticities of probability of takeover and return from long term invest-
ment. If the probability of e￿ort is relatively more elastic than the long term
returns, i.e.:￿"￿ > "q then e2 > e￿
2. If, on the other hand, the he long term
returns are relatively more elastic with respect to e￿ort than the probability
of e￿ort i.e.￿"￿ < "q then e2 < e￿
2.
6Intuitively, if ￿(￿), the probability of takeover is very sensitive to changes
in e2, this could be the case because of a low improvement value, or alter-
natively if the return function is relatively less sensitive to changes in e2
then e2 > e￿
2. In this case the manager’s investment decision will be biased
towards long term projects. Because the bene￿t he gets by reducing the
probability of takeover outweighs the forgone earnings from short term in-
vestments hence he overinvests in long term projects. On the other hand, if
￿(￿), the probability of takeover is not very sensitive to changes in e2, this
could be the case because of a high improvement value, or alternatively if
the return function is relatively more sensitive to e2 then e2 < e￿
2, that is
the manager’s decision will be biased towards short term projects. This is
because the probability of takeover declines but not very much as a response
to increase in long term investment while the foregone earnings from short
term investments will be much higher, hence the manager prefers to invest
more on short term investments which generates sure income.
Proposition below summarizes the results when the probability of takeover
is endogenous.
Proposition 3: If minf￿;v ￿ q2 (e2)g = ￿ then e1 = b e1 > e￿
1 and e2 =
b e2 < e￿
2: If minf￿;v ￿ q2 (e2)g = v ￿ q2 (e2) then
1. if ￿"￿ > "q then e2 > e￿
2, and
2. if ￿"￿ < "q then e2 < e￿
2.
In general, it is ambiguous how the long term investment will change
when the probability of takeover can be a￿ected by the manager’s initial
allocation of his constant time between short and long term projects. There
is a room for overinvestment in long term projects even when there is a threat
of takeover.
In analysis above we have assumed that a = b, that is the share of manager
from short and long term earnings are equal. So in terms of their contribution
to his income he does not di￿erentiate between them. The result will continue
to be the same in terms of direction but will be stronger if a < b. What if
a > b? By setting a > b in the initial contract we are giving an additional
incentive to the manager to choose higher levels of e1. One could argue that
if initial shareholders want to encourage the possible takeovers in future,
they might prefer a > b in the initial compensation contract to prevent the
distortion in the manager’s incentive to invest to reduce a possibility of a
takeover in the future.
73 Conclusion
This paper attempts to show that a threat of takeover does not necessar-
ily lead to managerial myopia. The result heavily depend on the way the
probability of takeover is modelled. We have assumed that the probability of
takeover depends on investment in long term projects negatively. This con-
trasts with models that stress managerial myopia as Stein [10] which relies
on the assumption that the stock market undervalues the long term projects
hence reduces the current price of the ￿rm making them more vulnerable
to possible takeovers. However, in a well functioning stock markets current
prices re￿ect the relevant information to uninformed traders about the fu-
ture pro￿tability of the ￿rm.(see Holmstrom and Tirole [3] and Kyle [4]).4
Hence in a such a world, the probability of takeover will be a function of fu-
ture earnings as long as current prices do re￿ect them. A manager will have
an incentive to shift his resources to the long term projects simply because
the equilibrium price is determined by future earnings and he can a￿ect the
probability of takeover by increasing the equilibrium price through the long
run investments.
An extension of the model is to introduce a rather general framework
(a la Holmstrom and Tirole [3]) with di￿erent type of investors (owners,
liquidity traders, speculative traders) and endogenize the current stock price
as a function of future earnings, hence, the manager’s investment decision.
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